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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEMPORAL
COGNITION IN 6- TO 10-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN
By
Danielle DeNigris
Advisor: Dr. Patricia J. Brooks
The ability to represent and make sense of time requires the mental
representations of the ordering of events and temporal relations, abstract time concepts,
natural biological rhythms, the self and other through time, and causal relationships. This
representational ability undergoes significant refinement in middle childhood concurrent
with advances in children’s language and nonverbal skills. This study explored the
representational development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral
prediction in relation to a battery of language and nonverbal abilities with the aims of
confirming age-related improvements, exploring whether disparate measures are indices
of an underlying ability, and examining the role of language and nonverbal abilities.
Sixty-two children (32 girls, 30 boys, M=8 years; 2 months, range 6;0-10;8)
completed standardized assessments of receptive vocabulary, receptive grammar,
reading, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory, in addition to the four
representational thought tasks. The temporal cognition tasks consisted of the Months
Relative Order task, assessing event ordering ability (e.g., knowledge of the sequence of
months), and the Time Labeling task, assessing knowledge of conventional time patterns
(e.g., day or month associated with specific events). The diachronic thinking task, Draw
Lifecycle of a Tree, assessed awareness of biological change over time and the behavioral
iv

prediction task, Character Intentions task (a measure of theory of mind adapted here to
assess the ability to predict future behaviors) assessed children’s understanding of
causality in time to infer a character’s future actions.
The first aim was supported providing confirmation of the age-related
improvements in representational thought documented in previous research. Results
revealed that accuracy on the Months Relative Order, Time Labeling, Draw Lifecycle of
a Tree, and Character Intentions tasks improved with age; however, the Draw Lifecycle
of a Tree task was only marginally significant. The second and third aims of the study
was to explore whether the four disparate measures of representational were significantly
related and if they provided evidence of an underlying ability. All tasks were
significantly correlated with one another after controlling for the effects of age. Principal
components analysis revealed one underlying factor explaining 57.84% of the variance
across tasks. To address the final aim, stepwise regressions explored relationships
between this latent variable and developmental changes in nonverbal intelligence,
working memory, and language ability. Results revealed that language ability predicted
gains in representational thought over and above effects of age, nonverbal intelligence,
and working memory. Additionally, mediation analyses showed that the effects of age,
nonverbal intelligence, and working memory were mediated by language abilities. These
results extend prior work by demonstrating the representational changes occurring in
middle childhood across complex cognitive domains while highlighting the role of
language as a mechanism promoting representational development.
Keywords: representational thought; temporal cognition; diachronic thinking;
behavioral prediction; language; middle childhood
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The ability to understand and represent time plays a critical role in supporting
daily living (Suddendorf, 2006). Mental representations of complex cognitive knowledge
undergo dramatic representational change during middle childhood, changing from
implicit (i.e., not consciously accessible) procedural knowledge to explicit (i.e.,
consciously accessible) knowledge that is able to be verbalized. One domain in which
representational change occurs is in the understanding of time. The ability to make sense
of time involves the representation of various forms of functional knowledge, including
temporal cognition (event ordering–i.e., awareness of one event following or preceding
another–and time labeling–i.e., knowing the days of the week or the months of the year),
diachronic thinking (grasping biological transformations across the lifespan), and
behavioral prediction (understanding causality in time in order to make inferences based
on past/current events and intentions). These disparate forms of representational
knowledge are rarely studied within the same group of participants; hence it remains
unclear whether they follow similar developmental trajectories and whether they are
indices of similar underlying cognitive abilities.
Theoretical Perspectives of Representational Development
Theories of cognitive development have been primarily motivated by research
from two camps, domain-generality and domain-specificity, in which cognitive
development progresses through the refinement of mental representations over time.
Much of the early literature on cognitive development stemmed from a Piagetian (1926)
model of cognitive construction. This model takes a domain-general approach suggesting
that development occurs sequentially (in stages) across all aspects of cognition. As we
1

progress through stages, procedural (sensorimotor) knowledge makes way for more
advanced mental representations of the world through the processes of assimilation (i.e.,
using existing schemas to interpret incoming information), accommodation (i.e., altering
existing and creating new schemas to accommodate incoming information), and
equilibration (i.e., the process in which we balance new and old information).
In contrast, domain-specific accounts, such as the modular system proposed by
Fodor (1983), maintain that the mind is made up of innate specified input systems
(modules) that are responsible for acting on certain types of input. To create mental
representations and make sense of the world, the mind’s central processor must combine
the output from specified modules with information stored in long-term memory.
However, there are some critical limitations to a modular theory of domain-specificity.
The following sections will discuss more recent approaches that argue for a similar
developmental framework to explore how mental representations change over time.
Karmiloff-Smith’s Representational Redescription View
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) provides an argument against both a fully Piagetian
constructivist approach and a fully nativist approach to the understanding of cognitive
development. She argues that Piaget’s domain-general approach cannot account for
specifically linguistic changes. She supports this view citing research on chimpanzees
(e.g., Premack, 1986) which have rich sensorimotor and representational abilities, but are
unable to have complex, human-like language. As such, the Piagetian notion that
development occurs across the board cannot hold true for language, and as an extension,
other specific aspects of cognition.
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On the other hand, Karmiloff-Smith critiques a completely modularized view of
the domain-specificity of development (i.e., Fodor’s 1983 theory of modularity). She
argues against modularity on three main accounts: modules are not so pre-specified in
detail as Fodor suggests; the dichotomy between the specified modules and the central
processor is not as strongly divided; and the modules do not automatically encode data
into a single language of thought. Although she argues for domain-specificity, she draws
a clear distinction between her theory and Fodor’s (1983) modularity. Karmiloff-Smith’s
theory goes “beyond modularity” to propose a domain-specific view that synthesizes neonativism and constructivism. Domains are defined as a set of representations sustaining a
specific knowledge area (e.g., language, physics, etc.); whereas a module is a processor
that encapsulates knowledge and conducts computations on it. Each domain
encompasses many microdomains, or subdomains (e.g., gravity is a microdomain of
physics). Karmiloff-Smith (1994) argues that development goes beyond “the triggered
unfolding of a genetic program” (p. 706); it is a gradual process by which information
that is in a cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledge to that system.
Karmiloff-Smith proposes a phase (not stage) theory of development in which
recurrent phase changes occur across microdomains and within each domain. Crucial to
this phase theory is that development within domains does not occur at the same time
across domains. In the first phase, the child focuses on external, procedural information
resulting in behavioral mastery (successful performance) within that microdomain.
Eventually (phase two) the child no longer focuses predominantly on external
information and instead focuses on the internal representations of knowledge in that
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microdomain. Finally, in phase three, the internal representations and external
information are integrated and a balance is found.
The critical aspect in this process is representational redescription. KarmiloffSmith (1992) describes this as a mental process whereby the child redescribes, or alters,
existing internal mental representations to clear the way for more explicit and
sophisticated representations and use of knowledge. This process increases the flexibility
of the knowledge that is stored in the mind and the child’s representations become
progressively more manipulable leading to explicit (i.e., conscious) access to knowledge.
The process of representational redescription is a uniquely human way of gaining access
to and making use of information stored in the mind, first within a domain and then
sometimes across domains.
Karmiloff-Smith posits four levels, each with different representational formats,
in which knowledge is represented and redescribed moving from implicit to explicit. In
the first level, Level Implicit, information from the external environment is represented in
procedural form. There is no representational links within or between domains. At the
second level, Level Explicit-1, implicit representations are redescribed into a new explicit
format. These explicit representations are now manipulable and allow children to
introduce violations to their knowledge of the world. This allows for developments like
false-belief; however, these representations are not available to conscious access nor able
to be verbalized. Level Explicit-2 enables representations to be consciously accessible,
but still not verbalized. Finally, at Level Explicit-3, representations are redescribed into a
format similar to natural language that allows for both conscious access and verbal report.
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As a result of this process, there exists multiple representations in the mind of similar
knowledge at different levels of explicitness across domains.
Nelson’s Experiential (Social-Cultural) View
For Nelson (1993; 1996) children develop representational thought through lived
experience. Theses representations emerge through interaction with a social and cultural
world, but are constructed according to “built in” cognitive principles. Like KarmiloffSmith, Nelson believes that there are levels of representation that undergo
representational change. And while both theorists recognize the representational function
of language that allows for representational change from implicit mental representations
to explicit and linguistic representations, they differ in the specific role that language
plays. Where Karmiloff-Smith suggests that representational changes occur within the
child who interacts with the physical world, Nelson believes that representational change
occurs through socially-mediated processes. More specifically, language plays a critical
role in the change from implicit to explicit mental representations. Nelson (1996) argues
that it is the “mental representation function of language that…is the basis for the evident
cognitive advances in the latter part of the preschool years” (p.15).
Nelson (1996) outlines her experiential view of representational change as
constituted by chunks of socially- and culturally-situated events that the child experiences
that provide critical information about the events from which they are embedded. This
information becomes stored as mental event representations (MERs), representations of
familiar significant repeated events. Eventually, as the child continually adds to their
stock of MERs, they can be generalized across events, people, places, etc. and stored in
an increasingly elaborate “world model.” Central to this idea, is that the child must make
5

use of previously stored information to explore and interpret current events. The child
must combine their previously internalized representations with the specific features of
the present context. This highlights the critical role of the memory system, and
particularly episodic memory, in the development of advanced cognitive representations.
Indeed, the child’s general knowledge base is informed by the episodic memory system,
in which is stored event information about the location and sequence of activities that
constitute specific events.
The main function of a representational system is to provide information about
present conditions, informed by the past, and to anticipate future conditions. To do so,
the child must accumulate information about general events. Within an event, actions are
sequentially organized which allows for the creation of script-like representations
(Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). Using these representations of repeated events, the child can
understand “what happens in a general case.” This script knowledge is evident in
children as young as 3-years of age, who are able to produce verbal scripts for familiar
events (such as having lunch). Indeed, Nelson (1986) suggests that young children are
more likely to produce general scripts than specific memory accounts. The scripts
produced by young preschoolers are found to be similar in structure to those produced by
adults, suggesting that general script knowledge precedes more explicit forms of specific
event representations (Nelson, 1996). It is in this movement from implicit procedural
scripts to explicit and verbal scripts, and then to explicit MERs that forms the backbone
for Nelson’s experiential, and socio-cultural, theory of cognitive development.
Nelson proposes that individual MERs support and are changed by linguistic
representations, all of which occurs as the child is mastering language. Throughout the
6

preschool years, language systems become organized and they begin to reorganize the
child’s conceptual systems. Language is based on categorical structures (e.g., phonemes,
morphemes, word meanings, and grammatical structures); as such, children apply
categorization strategies to the learning of language, as well as MERs. For example,
object concepts are first embedded in event representations. Children experience the
ways in which words are used by adults during social interactions and results in the
drawing out of “event embedded object categories” and eventual representational change
(Nelson & Lucariello, 1985), or redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). For example, the
child learns not only the link between the word “lunch” and the event “lunch,” but a
“representation of an entire event sequence that incorporates the word as well as the
props and the sequence of actions that constitute that event” (Nelson, 1996, p. 97). These
event categories are then combined and organized into a type of representational
hierarchy of event knowledge. Temporal representation, and particularly temporal
cognition, is central to the development of event knowledge. Time is organized
according to domain-specific principles and varies as a function of socio-cultural and
linguistic constructs (Nelson, 1991; 1996).
Representational Development of Temporal Knowledge
As adults, we make sense of time in terms of the ordering of events and temporal
relations, abstract manipulations of time concepts, natural biological rhythms, and an
understanding of the self and other through time. We refer to time in terms of two basic
dimensions, duration and sequence, that are extracted and constructed from our
experiences and memories for events. We also make sense of time based on our
understanding of temporal relations or sequences (i.e., that one component occurs before
7

and after others). These relations become a part of the child’s developing
representational system and may aid in the learning of the temporal language used to
express them. However, implicit aspects of experience (e.g., that certain events take
place during specific times during the day/week/year and not others) are more difficult
for young children to transform into linguistic concepts. The regularity of events may aid
in the understanding of conventional time concepts, such as clock-times, days, months,
etc., and thus provide meaning for these concepts. Particularly, as many concepts that are
used for marking time may be based on arbitrary divisions (e.g., minutes, hours, months,
etc.), in comparison to those based on natural cycles (e.g., morning, afternoon, day, night,
etc.) or social events (lunchtime, naptime, etc.).
Both Karmiloff-Smith (1992; 1994) and Nelson (1991; 1996) propose an
approach to cognitive development based on a continual process of representational
change from implicit (i.e., not consciously accessible) to explicit (i.e., consciously
accessible) knowledge. Applied to temporal knowledge, the two theories (KarmiloffSmith’s representational redescription and Nelson’s experiential view of event
representations) highlight the importance of language, though they differ in its specific
role. Karmiloff-Smith’s theory, though not specifically making claims about the
development of temporal knowledge, would suggest that children learn temporal
concepts from verbal interactions with others, but that early knowledge forms are stored
in a code not yet accessible or linked to similar knowledge stored in other forms. Nelson,
on the other hand, has described the emergence of the temporal mind in several
theoretical pieces (e.g., 1991; 1993; 1996). Time is organized according to domainspecific principles and varies as a function of socio-cultural and linguistic constructs. She
8

suggests that an understanding of time concepts results from involvement in and
representation of events and that this event knowledge may “implicitly embed” them
allowing for the “explication” through language to occur.
According to Nelson, knowledge of temporal concepts develops gradually
through experience with language forms relevant to ongoing events as they are used by
adults and others. Early on, children are exposed to, and oftentimes explicitly taught, the
temporal language about the seasons and holidays; yet, the language used to convey
conventional time units (days, months, years, etc.) are not explicitly taught until the child
enters formal schooling. Because these linguistic forms are used informally in discourse,
the child may become familiar with their forms, but when used, are often done in an
inaccurate way without expressing true meaning. Indeed, as the child observes its use
across multiple contexts, the temporal word or phrase, may become more generalized.
This constant adjustment of representation is essential as the child moves from preschool
into early childhood.
Building on the theoretical work by Nelson (1991; 1996) in which temporal
cognition is understood as developing through the involvement in and representation of
events, McCormack (2015) proposes a model of developmental stages in children’s
representation of time in which children develop increasingly event-independent
representations. In the earliest stage, children orient themselves in time through creating
representations of repeated event sequences. Here, children’s concepts of the past,
present, and future are of events as having been completed, ongoing, or yet to come. It is
not until the second stage in which children can understand the ontological difference
between the past (i.e., unalterable) and the future (i.e., potentially alterable). At this
9

stage, children can still not represent time independent of events nor linearly. Linear
representations of time occur in the third stage in which children begin to grasp how
causality operates in time. However, it is not until the fourth and final stage that
children’s representations of time become completely event-independent (i.e., a
representation of time that makes no references to events, as in the clock and calendar
systems).
As with the cognitive development models of Karmiloff-Smith and Nelson,
McCormack’s (2015) model of temporal cognition proposes a shift in the way time is
represented in the mind. This provides a foundation for the understanding of how
children represent the locations of events in time before fully mastering an explicit and
verbal event-independent representational system. McCormack’s (2015) theory suggests
that for children to have a full mastery of event-independent temporal cognition, they
must have a more general understanding of temporal sequence and causality.
Summary
Together, the three theoretical views of the role of representational change in the
development of temporal knowledge suggests that early on children rely on procedural
(sensorimotor) event knowledge from routinized prior experience to acquire and interpret
basic temporal concepts and patterns that can then be altered in order to be represented
verbally in event-independent ways. Those concepts that are directly related to
representations of time (e.g., sequence, duration, frequency, etc.) would be learned and
generalized to novel contexts more easily than those concepts that are not implicit in the
child’s mental representations (e.g., abstract concepts of temporal location and measuring

10

units). As such, socially-mediated language provides the fundamental component for
children to represent the passage of time.
The current study sought to evaluate this hypothesis while assessing the extent to
which tasks measuring disparate forms of temporal knowledge (temporal cognition,
diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction) relate to an underlying construct of
temporal representation during middle childhood. This age-range is particularly
important for exploring the representational development of temporal knowledge, and
cognitive development in general, because this is when children are at a level of
representation in which knowledge is explicitly defined but may not be fully accessible to
verbal reports. Middle childhood represents a time where children have the basic skills
needed for temporal representation, but may still not be fully successful in their attempts
to pass temporal representation tasks.

11

CHAPTER TWO: REPRESENTATIONS OF TIME
Time has often been treated as a dimension of events with a focus on duration
processing, but time can also be treated as a framework (e.g., a flexible mental
representation) within which events can be located. Temporal frameworks can be
distinguished along the lines of perspectival (location of events is relative to where one is
currently located in time) vs. nonperspectival (location of events is specified without
reference to where one is currently located in time) and repeating cycles (e.g., the
repeating cycle of the times of day, days of week, seasons of the year, etc.) vs. particular
times (unique temporal location that does not repeat, e.g., Monday, January 2, 2017;
McCormack, 2015).
Unlike in many areas of developmental psychology, there is no single established
set of tasks put forth to explore children’s representations of time. This is likely due the
varied ways in which temporal knowledge has been conceptualized in the literature. In
the following sections, the representational development of two event-independent
components of temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), biological temporal
sequence (diachronic thinking), and temporal causality (behavioral prediction) are
reviewed along with the role of verbal and nonverbal abilities in their development.
Temporal Cognition
Event Ordering
As adults, we have the ability to represent the position of events in time in terms
of location (to mark an event’s occurrence in terms of conventional time patterns),
distance (to estimate how far an event is from the present) and relative order (to
determine whether an event occurred/will occur before or after some other event). How
12

does this ability to order events in time develop? Early on, infants appear to form
representations of routine events that occur in their daily lives, such as taking a bath,
mealtime, or playing peek-a-boo (Bruner, 1983; Nelson, 1996; McCormack, 2015).
These script-like representations allow young children to anticipate events in their daily
lives and make predictions about what will happen next (Schank & Abelson, 1977;
Forman, 2015). Scripts also allow children to locate themselves in time by locating
themselves at a particular point within a scripted event (McCormack, 2015).
With regards to verbalizing the order in which events unfold, children as young
as 3 years can correctly report sequences of events, such as how to get ready for bed, and
by the age of 4 years, they can arrange everyday events, such as waking up, eating
breakfast, going to school, eating dinner, and going to bed, in correct temporal order
(Friedman, 1990). Young children’s success on this type of task suggests that they have
ready access to temporally structured representations that provide the foundation for
children to represent the temporal locations of events relative to each other. Research
indicates that event ordering abilities, although emerging during the preschool years,
undergo developmental advances during middle childhood (Friedman, 1993; 2000; 2005;
Friedman, Gardner, & Zubin, 1995; Friedman & Kemp, 1998; Friedman, Reese & Dai,
2011). Four- and 5-year-olds can make accurate judgments about the past when
comparing two events experienced several weeks apart (Friedman et al., 1995); however,
children at this age, as well as some older children (8- and 9-year-olds), made errors
when asked to place future annual events (e.g., common holidays) in temporal order
(Friedman, 2000).
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By the time children are 8 to 10 years, they can reliably order the months of the
year and can successfully integrate the order of conventional time labels with the fact that
they are cyclical and reoccur (Friedman, 1978). At this point, children can then start to
order temporal sequences using different starting points. However, children find it more
difficult to conduct relative order tasks using different starting points for months of the
year than for days of the week (Friedman, 1978). More recent work (Moore et al., 2014),
asking children to sequence events in forward or backward order, confirmed that older
children (8- to 10-year-olds) were more accurate in ordering events than younger children
(5- to 7-year-olds).
Together, these results suggest that early on children can verbally represent the
temporal locations of actions within repeated script-like events relative to each other.
These scripts enable children to locate events relative to other events within thematic
contexts (e.g., holidays, daily routine, going to the supermarket, etc.). However, scripts
do not provide children with a way to locate events from one thematic context relative to
events from another unrelated context (McCormack, 2015). Compare this to the clock
and calendar systems which allow children to consider the relative temporal locations of
any two events, whether they are related or not. Yet, these systems are not mastered until
middle-late childhood (Friedman, 2000).
Time Labeling
Children’s understanding of life events depends upon their understanding of time
concepts and an implicit understanding of temporal relations (Nelson, 1996). As such,
children must have a functional representation system for time in terms of sequence,
duration, and frequency. These implicit aspects of experience may be difficult for young
14

children to translate into linguistic concepts and they may instead make use of event
labels (e.g., lunch) that are based in daily routines prior to using other conventional time
labels (e.g., 12 o’clock). For example, preschool children typically respond to timerelated questions about an event by referencing other events or by thinking about time in
terms of their distance from the present, rather than locating the event on a calendar or
referencing the associated time of the day (McCormack, 2015; Nelson, 1996).
Eventually, children learn to link regularly experienced events with times of the day or
the year which serves to ground the meaning of specific time labels, such as 12 o’clock or
noon, in relation to events, such as lunch. It is not until middle childhood that children
reliably use conventional calendar terms, such as days and months of the year, in place of
event-based or distance-based judgements to mark time.
Under Nelson’s view, initial learning of temporal concepts occurs informally in
the context of social interaction. Children’s first temporal references are usually
“interpretatively framed by adults (e.g., the child says ‘berries’ and the adult responds
‘Yes, we ate berries for breakfast this morning, didn’t we?’)” (Nelson & Fivush, 2004, p.
492). Temporal concepts are elaborated through conversational language, especially in
contexts where caregivers and children reminisce about past events and plan for the
future. Many lexical and grammatical terms integral to the discussion of events, such as
relative and specific time labels (e.g., tomorrow, November) and locators (e.g., before,
after, during) are learned through conversation and begin to be used more consistently at
around the age of 5 years (Nelson, 1996; Weist, 1986).
Upon school entry, children are formally taught specific concepts of temporality,
such as the days, months, seasons, and holidays of the year. By around 6 to 7 years,
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children can recite sequences of time labels, such as the days of the week, in order, and at
around 9 years of age, they show understanding of the cyclical nature of time (Friedman,
1978). In one study, Friedman, Reese, and Dai (2011) examined memory for the times of
events that had occurred in the past 6 months to 4 years, and observed that 8- to 12-yearold children were able to localize many of the events in time in terms of the season,
month, and time of day. Using similar tasks, Moore and colleagues (2014) found that 8to 10-year-olds were more accurate in their labeling of time concepts than 5- to 7-yearolds. However, research indicates that even in this age range children make errors.
Friedman and Laycock (1989) suggested that children possess knowledge of individual
time markers (e.g., knowing the month of one’s birthday or the clock times of an activity)
before understanding the conventional system (e.g., order of the months or times of day)
as a whole. These findings suggest that by middle childhood, children are beginning to
master conventional temporal systems and use them along with their knowledge of
repeated events within the annual cycle to aid in the ability to locate events in time
(McCormack, 2015). The mastery of the clock and calendar systems enables children to
flexibly represent time in a linear, unified, event-independent way.
Diachronic Thinking
Diachronic thinking, defined as the capacity to represent and understand changes
that occur over time, has been extensively explored by Montangero, Pons, and colleagues
from a Piagetian framework in which a child’s actions and observations of the world lead
the child to construct more abstract conceptualizations of object transformations over
time (e.g., Boucher et al., 2007; Montangero, 1985; Montangero, Pons, & Cattin, 2000;
Pons & Montangero, 1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992). This can be compared to
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Nelson’s (1996) discussion of natural time, or time thought of in terms of basic biological
rhythms and cycles of the natural world. One widely studied aspect of diachronic
thinking concerns children’s understanding of qualitative biological changes, for
example, the understanding that a seed becomes a plant and an infant becomes an adult,
all the while never changing in identity.
Children’s understanding of biological transformation has been investigated in
relation to the life cycle of plants and animals (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Labrell &
Stefaniak, 2011; Leddon, Waxman, & Medin, 2008; Maurice-Naville & Montangero,
1992; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992) where children come to understand time relating to
birth, death, and aging. Research suggests that children do not initially include plants in
the “living” domain (Nguyen & Gelman, 2002), which Labrell and Stefaniak (2011)
suggested was due to the fact that the surface properties of plants do not promote this
classification. Hickling and Gelman (1995) reported that although children as young as 4
years of age understood the origins of seeds, they did not understand the diachronic
conception of biology (i.e., that growth is a cycle of changes over time). As such, the
understanding of time is integral to the development of diachronic thinking; yet, apart
from Montangero (1996), few have explored the connection of time and diachronic
change.
According to Montangero, the temporal concepts of span, sequentiality, and
chronology are fundamental to an advanced understanding of biological change.
Children appear to progress through three levels of diachronic thinking (Maurice-Naville
& Montangero, 1992; Montangero, Pons & Scheidegger, 1996; Pons & Montangero,
1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992). At the first level, they fail to construct links
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between past, present, and future stages of life (i.e., change is not thought of as a
continuous process). At the second level, emerging at around 9 years of age, children
conceive of continuous change, but only in quantitative terms (i.e., growth). At the third
stage, thought to emerge at 11 or 12 years of age, children grasp that objects change both
quantitatively and qualitatively over time.
Other researchers (e.g., Cox & Hodsoll, 2000; Labrell & Stefaniak, 2011; Nguyen
& Gelman, 2002) have argued that children grasp aspects of diachronic change at earlier
ages than those proposed by Montangero and colleagues (e.g., Maurice-Naville &
Montangero, 1992; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992). For example, Labrell and Stefaniak
(2011) examined the development of the diachronic conceptions of growth and death of
plants and animals among 163 children aged 6 to 11 years. Results showed a main effect
of age with 6- and 7-year-olds performing more poorly than older children; however, the
researchers failed to observe differences among children between 8 and 11 years of age
on either the animal or plant tasks. Nevertheless, despite some disagreements about the
precise ages at which children pass specific tasks, these studies and others (e.g., Moore et
al., 2014) indicate significant changes in diachronic thinking in middle childhood.
Causality and the Prediction of Future Behaviors
In order to understand and interact with others, a child must be successful at the
prediction of others’ and one’s own future actions and reactions (Nelson, 1996). The
ability to predict future events likely draws upon the temporal skills previously reviewed,
as well as the understanding of the causal structure that connects events in time
(McCormack, 2015). The ability to distinguish between past and future events involves
the ability to take a temporal perspective other than the present. For example, “it
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involves realizing that from the perspective of the past, some events were in the future
that are now in the past, and from the perspective of the future, events will be in the past
that are now in the future” (McCormack, 2015, p. 654). This ability to shift temporal
perspective relies upon the understanding of how causality operates in time.
However, a majority of the literature on children’s projective minds focuses on
their ability to plan for a specific future task or their understanding of others’ mental
states (i.e., theory of mind). Of the research focused on future planning, many have been
concerned with the emergence of future-oriented thinking in preschool-aged children,
with a typical task requiring children to select items for use in a future event. For
example, Atance and O’Neill (2005) asked 3-year-olds to imagine going on a trip with
their parents; children were shown a group of eight items of which they had to choose
three to take on the trip and to provide a reason for their choice. Justifications were
coded for reference to present or future states. Results showed that the 3-year-olds
referred to the future 37% of the time when choosing items for their trip, compared with
46% referral to the present.
Similarly, Atance and Meltzoff (2005) gave 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds a book with
different landscapes and asked them to choose an item that they would take with them if
they were walking across the landscape in the photograph and to explain their choices.
Choices were tailored to each photograph, e.g., given a photograph of a sunny desert,
children chose between sunglasses, soap, and a mirror (with the sunglasses being the
correct choice because in the future scenario one could anticipate wanting to shield the
eyes from the sun). Not only did older children choose the correct choice more often than
younger children, they also provided more future-oriented reasons for their choice.
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Russell, Alexis, and Clayton (2010) replicated these findings with children selecting
items needed to play a future game. Together these findings support the claims (e.g.,
Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Russell et al., 2010) that the ability to
think about the future emerges during the preschool years. However, little is known
about the development of this ability beyond the preschool years.
To fully grasp that events in the future are altered by events occurring between
now and then (and that events from the past influence present actions and events),
children must be able to think about points in time as representing a temporal sequence
with open slots at the end that can be filled in various ways (McCormack, 2015). The
ability to predict future behaviors relies on an understanding of temporal order and an
ability to situate events in time. Additionally, to move beyond general script memory to
episodic “autonoetic” memory (i.e., the awareness of our existence and identity extending
from the personal past through the present to the future; Mahr & Csibra, 2017; Tulving,
1972; 1985), the child must have an understanding of the self in time. This includes
awareness of how a person’s current and future actions are influenced by past experiences
and other people. Theory of mind provides children with the tools needed to understand
the subjective nature of memories and to appreciate that others may hold different beliefs,
values, and thoughts that cause them to act in various ways. As such, theory of mind is
necessary for making behavioral predictions. As the child comes to understand and
interpret what other people believe, they become able to predict their actions based on
these interpretations.
The ability to track the mental lives and experiences of individuals typically does
not emerge until the ages of 3 to 5 years as demonstrated in the theory of mind literature
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(see Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008, for a review). However, few have explored
developments in theory of mind in middle childhood (see Aldrich & Brooks, 2017;
Cantin, Gnaedinger, Gallaway, Hesson-McInnis & Hund, 2016; Miller, 2009; 2012 for
exceptions). More so, majority of research has focused on false-belief tasks, wherein a
child must predict the behavior of a character who holds a mistaken belief about an object
(e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983), which requires an understanding of intentional mental
states. This line of research tends to have a ceiling effect after the age of 5 years, limiting
its utility in exploring developments beyond emergence (Devine & Hughes, 2013). The
literature focusing on tasks suitable for studying advanced theory of mind has explored
tasks requiring perspective taking (e.g., Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd,
2011), understanding others’ beliefs (e.g., Devine & Hughes, 2013; Happé, 1994), and
identifying others’ emotions (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb,
2001), and suggest that theory of mind continues to develop into adolescence. These
types of advanced theory of mind tasks may tap into similar cognitive abilities needed in
behavioral prediction, as one would likely draw on others’ perspectives, beliefs, and
emotional states in order to make predictions about their future behaviors.
Influence of Language and Nonverbal Abilities
Concurrent with the development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking and
behavioral prediction skills, children are advancing their language and nonverbal skills.
The literature highlights the links between temporal knowledge and nonverbal
intelligence (e.g., Moore et al., 2014) and general memory systems (see Nelson, 1996 for
a review); however, a much larger body of literature has discussed the importance of
various language skills on the development of disparate forms of temporal representation.
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Links between temporal representation and children’s ability to understand and use
temporal terms and verb tenses have been proposed (Harner, 1975; 1980; Weist, 1986),
suggesting that children can reason about the past and future only once they can flexibly
use verbal constructions that convey temporal meanings. As discussed previously,
Nelson (1991; 1996) provides a theoretical perspective highlighting the ways in which
language and experience inform and change mental representations. Children are thought
to develop representations of temporal concepts and patterns through informal
experiences with the language forms (i.e., grammar and the lexicon) related to temporal
knowledge during ongoing activities.
Grammar is integral in the understanding of temporal relations; it encompasses
tense, aspect, and syntactic constructions that indicate temporal perspective. Although,
toddlers begin to refer to the past in terms of just-completed tasks or familiar routines
(e.g., “All gone”; Fivush & Nelson, 2004), it is not until the age of 2 to 3 years of age that
the child’s vocabulary increases, producing short sentences and engaging in
conversations with others. At this age, children begin to use past and future tense and
other temporal grammatical structures, but often inaccurately. Gerhardt (1989) argues
that young children’s early use of tense and aspect are not true distinctions between past
and present, but rather present and not-present. As such, children must continually adjust
their grammatical representations of time before accurately distinguishing between
temporal perspectives. Indeed, between the ages of 3 and 7 years, children’s accurate use
and understanding of the past and future tense increases dramatically (Harner, 1975;
1980). Regarding temporal language, grammar is proposed to precede semantic
conceptualizations (Nelson, 1996). These semantic conceptualizations can take the form
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of nouns, adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions and can refer to a location in time, a
sequence of events, or a duration of time.
There is debate in the field as to whether all or only particular aspects of language
are involved in reprensentational development, with a significant body of research in the
domain of theory of mind. Here it is argued that certain theory of mind skills, e.g.,
inferring intentions and making predictions, are an integral component in the
development of temporal knowledge and reflect an understanding of the causal and linear
characteristics of time (McCormack, 2015). Research from this literature has
predominantly debated the role of semantic ability (facts) versus syntactic ability (rules).
For example, some (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; deVilliers, 2005) argue that
measures of syntax and memory for sentential complements allow the child to represent
the beliefs of others and would therefore be important in the development of theory of
mind. Alternatively, semantics allow a child to participate in social conversations that
become the basis for the development of the mental representations needed to represent
the beliefs of others (Nelson, 2005; note that Nelson also highlights the importance of
grammar). A recent meta-analysis of 104 studies of theory of mind in children under the
age of 7 indicates that general language abilities were more strongly related to theory of
mind than any specific aspect of language (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). A study
of theory of mind in middle childhood (Grazzani & Ornaghi, 2012) demonstrated a link
between theory of mind and metacognitive language comprehension, use of
psychological lexicon, and general verbal ability, again suggesting that the specific type
of language measure is not integral to the relationship between representational thought
and language.
23

This is the perspective held by Bates (1994; Bates & Goodman, 1997) who argues
for the inseparability of grammar and the lexicon in the development of representational
thought. She argues that since grammar and the lexicon develop similarly in infancy and
break down similarly in brain-injured patients, the two are therefore represented together
in the mind and processed by the same mechanisms for other cognitive abilities. Like
Nelson (1996), Bates (1994) proposes that language is a system embedded in time and
that language learning is fundamental to the development of temporal cognition and other
temporal representations and vice versa. As such, the current study aims to explore the
links between various components of language (receptive vocabulary, receptive grammar,
and reading) and nonverbal (nonverbal intelligence and working memory) abilities in the
representational development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral
prediction during middle childhood.
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CHAPTER THREE: CURRENT RESEARCH
Rationale
Despite the verbal and nonverbal gains that are apparent in middle-childhood, a
time when children are entering formal schooling and becoming increasingly independent
in managing their own schedules, much of the literature on the development of temporal
cognition has focused on its emergence. This study seeks to explore temporal cognition
in relation to other aspects of temporal representation (diachronic thinking and behavioral
prediction) to confirm the age-related representational changes that have been
documented in the literature (e.g., Boucher et al., 2013; Friedman, 2000; McCormack,
2015; Moore et al., 2014) in a community sample of 6- to 10-year-old children. We
utilized two tasks of temporal cognition, Months Relative Order and Time Labeling, to
assess event ordering and time labeling abilities, respectively. Additionally, we utilized
two additional tasks of complex temporal representation, Draw Lifecycle of a Tree and
Character Intentions, to assess diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction,
respectively. The Character Intentions task is a novel means of exploring behavioral
prediction as this task was originally designed to assess advanced theory of mind by
requiring individuals to predict the future behavior of characters by inferring their
intentions. This type of theory of mind task requires similar skills needed in many future
planning and behavioral prediction tasks and requires an understanding of the causal
nature of time, making it a unique way to explore an aspect of representational thought
necessary for a full mastery of temporal cognition.
This research also examines individual differences in task performance on the
four measures as evidence that underlying changes apply across disparate aspects of
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cognition. Building on work by Moore and colleagues (2014) who explored individual
differences in event ordering, time labeling and diachronic thinking over middle
childhood, we used principal components analysis to determine whether disparate
measures of temporal representation would load onto one or more underlying factors.
Moore et al. (2014) observed performance on battery of event ordering, time labeling,
and diachronic thinking tasks to load onto two factors, with Factor 1 associated with
performance across all tasks, as well as measures of verbal and nonverbal intelligence,
and Factor 2 distinguishing one of the measures of diachronic thinking from the spatial
event ordering task and the time labeling task. Their study provided a starting point for
the exploration of representational change in the domain of temporal knowledge;
however, there are several notable limitations to address. The first is that the researchers
used standardized scores in regression analyses. Considering that the regressions also
included age as a predictor, this is problematic as standardized scores already have parsed
out age effects. Yet, that the results of vocabulary remained significant suggests the
strength of the contribution of language to temporal abilities above and beyond agerelated changes.
Additionally, the study conducted by Moore and colleagues (2014) included only
one assessment of verbal ability (receptive vocabulary) and one assessment of nonverbal
ability (nonverbal intelligence). Considering what is theorized about the contribution of
language to temporal abilities, studies employing a battery of language assessments are
needed. This is particularly helpful in teasing apart the debate on the separability of
grammar and the lexicon (e.g., Bates & Goodman, 1997; de Villiers, 2005). Additionally,
research should include additional measures of nonverbal abilities, particularly those
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measuring executive function skills as these have been found to contribute to temporal
abilities such as planning (e.g., Cohen, 1996; Owen, 1997; Gilhooly, 2005).
Therefore, the current study examines performance on two traditional tasks of
temporal cognition in relation to temporal tasks of diachronic thinking and behavioral
prediction. This study explores the relationship of these four disparate tasks and various
indices of verbal and nonverbal abilities. Including measures of receptive vocabulary,
receptive grammar, and reading is integral for a study exploring the role of language in
the development of temporal cognition and related temporal representation abilities to
determine if gains are driven by general or specific language abilities above and beyond
the influence of nonverbal abilities.
Research Aims
This study explores the role of language in the development of temporal
representation in middle childhood. Specifically, the current study examines the relations
among tasks of temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), diachronic
thinking, and behavioral prediction across age, as well as the role of verbal and nonverbal
abilities among a community sample of 6- to 10-year-old children. The aims of the
current study are guided by the following research questions:
1. Does performance on temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral
prediction tasks provide support for the age-related improvements in
representational thought reported in prior research?
2. Is performance on two traditional tasks of temporal cognition (event ordering and
time labeling) related to performance on tasks of diachronic thinking and
behavioral prediction?
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3. Does the shared variance in performance across these four tasks provide evidence
that underlying changes in representational thought apply across disparate aspects
of cognition?
4. What is the role of language and nonverbal abilities in the development of
temporal representation in middle childhood?
a. More specifically, does language predict gains in representational change
above and beyond the influence of age and nonverbal abilities?
b. Are representational changes better predicted by specific language abilities
or general language?
Research has documented increased temporal abilities throughout middle
childhood in temporal cognition (e.g., Friedman, 2000; Moore et al., 2014), as well as in
diachronic thinking (e.g., Boucher et al., 2013; Montangero, 1996; Moore et al., 2014).
To my knowledge, there has not been formal research on behavioral predictions related to
temporal knowledge in middle childhood; however, research suggests that middle
childhood is a time of increasing theory of mind and perspective taking abilities (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Happé, 1994). Therefore, it is
predicted that age will be correlated with all four tasks in the current study. Additionally,
based on the work by Moore and colleagues (2014) who reported links between tasks of
event ordering, time labeling, and diachronic thinking, it is hypothesized that the four
tasks in the current study will load onto one factor, providing support for an underlying
representational ability across disparate forms of temporal knowledge.
The final aim of the paper is to explore the roles of language and nonverbal
abilities in the development of temporal representation. Both Karmiloff-Smith (1992;
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1994) and Nelson (1991; 1996) propose a driving role of language in cognitive
development in that language provides the representational format for making procedural
(sensorimotor) knowledge more explicit (consciously accessible). Although the current
study will be the first to explore various components of representational change in
relation to a battery of language and nonverbal assessments, prior work suggests that
language will predict gains beyond the contributions of age, nonverbal intelligence, and
working memory. Here it is proposed that language is an interconnected system and not
a mere labeling of time concepts; as such, verbal mediation of representational
development across domains of temporal knowledge (temporal cognition, diachronic
thinking, and behavioral prediction) will be explored. Lastly, it is predicted that
regardless of the language assessment entered in to the model, language will predict gains
above and beyond age and nonverbal abilities. Support for this hypothesis comes from
the research of Bates (1998; Bates et al., 1979; Bates & Goodman, 1997) on the general
role that language plays in the development of symbolic or representational thought and
the inseparability of grammar and the lexicon.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD
Participants
Participants were 62 school-aged children, 30 boys and 32 girls (M = 8 years; 2
months, SD = 1;3, range 6;0−10;8) from the New York City metropolitan area, primarily
Staten Island and New Jersey. Participants were recruited through a child subject pool or
using flyers posted at the college and neighboring institutions. Parents were asked to fill
out an online background questionnaire about themselves and their children (see
Appendix A). Ethnicity was distributed as follows: 64.5% Caucasian (n = 40), 11.3%
Black/African American (n = 7), 6.5% Middle Eastern (n = 4), 4.8% Hispanic/Latino (n =
3), 1.6% Asian (n = 1), and 11.3% Mixed Race (n = 7). Formal socio-economic status
information was not obtained, however, see Appendix B for parent education level. All
children were native speakers of English; ten children spoke another language in addition
to English at home. None of the children met clinical cut-offs for language disorders
(Core Language Score: M = 105.87; SD = 13.15; range = 75 – 126) as evidenced by
scores on the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Fourth Edition (CELF–4;
Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003; see also Appendix C for parental report of children’s
language abilities). Institutional Review Board approval was obtained. Informed consent
was obtained from parents and children provided written assent. Families were given $20
gift cards at the end of each session as compensation for their time.
Materials and Measures
Temporal Representation Tasks
Four tasks were selected from the published literature to evaluate relationships
among disparate assessments of temporal representation.
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Months Relative Order task (Friedman, 2000). This temporal cognition task is a
measure of event ordering ability that assessed children’s abilities to position specific
months in relation to other months. Children were shown stimulus cards, each with the
name of a month written on it. Eight stimulus cards were used in total, displaying the
name of a month (two months randomly selected from each quarter of the calendar year).
On each of eight trials, children were given two response choices (four and eight months
in the future) and asked to indicate the month that would come next in the calendar
(Figure 1). For example, individual questions would take the form: “Does February or
June come next after October?” (Friedman, 2000, p. 928). Each response was scored as
correct (score of 1) or incorrect (score of 0). Scores were tallied across the trials and
averaged to create an overall accuracy score.

Figure 1. Months Relative Order stimulus and response choice cards.
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Time Labeling task (adapted from months of the holidays task; Friedman,
2000). This temporal cognition task is an assessment of children’s knowledge of
conventional time patterns that involved associating events with a specific day of the
week or month of the year. Children were presented with stimulus cards (summer,
Christmas, start of the school year, Thanksgiving, Halloween, Valentine’s Day, start of
the school week, and weekend; Figure 2) one at a time in random orders. Children were
asked, “What month(s) is(are) ____?” for each of the four holidays, summer, and start of
school year cards, and “What day(s) of the week is(are) ____?” for the start of the school
week and weekend cards. Each response was scored as correct (score of 1) or incorrect
(score of 0). For the summer and weekend cards, responses were scored as correct if the
child responded with any combination of the correct responses. Scores were tallied
across the 8 trials and averaged to create an overall accuracy score.

Figure 2. Time Labeling Task stimulus cards (note that the calendar card was
used for “start of the school week” and “weekend” trials).
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Draw Lifecycle of a Tree task (adapted from Transformation task; Boucher,
Pons, Lind, & Williams, 2007). This diachronic thinking task is an assessment of
children’s understanding of biological change and transformation. Children were given a
blank sheet of paper and a set of colored pencils/markers and asked to draw a picture of a
tree. After completing the drawing, children were given two additional sheets of paper,
one to the left and one to the right of the paper with their drawing of the tree, and told: “I
want you to draw some more pictures to show me the whole life of the tree, how it looked
before this and how it will look after this. I’ll write “Before” over here (paper on the
left), and “After‟ over here (paper on the right). You can draw as many pictures as you
like. Remember to draw the whole life of the tree” (Boucher et al., 2007, p. 1416- 1417).
Non-specific prompts (e.g., “Now show me how it looked after this” or “Remember, I
want you to draw the whole life of the tree”) were provided as necessary. Any comments
made by children while drawing were written down. Testing was terminated when a
child drew at least one before and one after picture. Modified by Moore and colleagues
(2014) from the original transformation task, if a child failed to draw a picture, the
researcher asked if the child knew how to draw what they were thinking about. If this
was the case, the child was asked to explain what he or she would like to draw and the
response was written verbatim on the paper. The sets of trees were scored from 0 to 2
(Figure 3), with a score of 0 reflecting drawings that differed only in size with no
indication of a qualitative change (e.g., three drawings of similar-looking trees increasing
in height), a score of 1 reflecting drawings that differed in size and depicted a qualitative
change in either the before or after drawings (e.g., a smaller, but qualitatively similar tree
to the original drawing and a tree without leaves, a tree lying on the ground, or just a
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stump), and a score of 2 for drawings that included trees showing qualitative changes in
both the before and after drawings (e.g., drawings of a seedling or young shoot, a tree,
and a fallen tree or stump). In instances where verbal responses or comments were
recorded, the child received a score that reflected what he or she said the drawing was.

Figure 3. Draw Lifecycle of a Tree scoring examples.
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Character Intentions task (modified from Brunet et al., 2003). This
behavioral prediction task was originally developed as a nonverbal assessment of theory
of mind for adults with schizophrenia, but was adapted here for use with children to
explore behavioral prediction and the understanding of causality in time. The task
required children to infer a character’s future action from a series of depicted events. The
task consisted of 16 short, 3-picture comic strips, each featuring a character with a
specific intention (Figure 4). Children were provided a choice of 3 possible conclusions
to each scenario in the form of answer cards. One answer card was a logical conclusion
that matched the character’s intention and causal sequence (far right) and 2 answer cards
were distractors: one unrelated to the context of the scenario (far left) and one not
unrelated, but with no causal link to the intentional context of the scenario (middle).
Scored across trials were tallied and averaged to create an overall accuracy score.

Figure 4. Character Intentions task (printed with permission from Brunet et al., 2003)
cartoon trial (top) and response choices (bottom).
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Assessments of Language Abilities
Global language. The Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Fourth
Edition (CELF–4; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003) is a norm-referenced assessment of
receptive and expressive language abilities related to content, memory, and structure
suitable for individuals between the ages of 5 and 21 years; 11 months. To characterize
the sample and test for the presence of a language disorder, all children completed the
following sections: Concepts and Following Directions, Recalling Sentences, Formulated
Sentences, Word Classes-Receptive, Word Classes-Total. Additionally, children ages 6
to 8 years completed the Word Structure and Sentence Structure sections; while children
ages 9 to 11 years completed the Word Classes-Expressive section.
Receptive vocabulary. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test–Fourth Edition
(PPVT–4; Dunn & Dunn, 2007) is a norm-referenced, untimed test of receptive
vocabulary (i.e., understanding of spoken language) for Standard American English
suitable for individuals between the ages of 2 years; 6 months and 90+ years. Children
were presented with sets of four pictures, one set at a time. The examiner spoke a word
referring to one of the four pictures and the child was asked to point to the picture that
best fit the word. For example, if the child was presented a page with pictures of a dog,
chair, boy, and bicycle, the examiner asked, “Can you point to the picture of the boy?”
After the child pointed to a picture on the page, the examiner proceeded to the next set of
pictures. Items were organized in ascending order based on difficulty level.
Receptive grammar. The Test for the Reception of Grammar–Second Edition
(TROG–2; Bishop, 2003) is a measure of the understanding of grammatical contrasts
suitable for individuals from the age of 4 through adulthood. The test targets sentence
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comprehension and contains 80 stimulus items arranged in blocks of 4, where children
were required to point to one of the four items that they consider is correct. Children
were tested on 20 grammatical concepts. Items were organized in ascending order based
on difficulty level.
Reading ability. The Woodcock Reading Mastery Tests–Third Edition (WRMT–
3; Woodcock, 2011) is a norm-referenced assessment of reading readiness and
achievement. Children completed the following sections: Word Identification, Word
Attack, Word Comprehension (Antonyms, Synonyms, Analogies), Passage
Comprehension, and Oral Reading Fluency. These subtests yielded scores of children’s
basic reading skills (first two subtests), reading comprehension (third and fourth
subtests), and oral reading fluency (fifth subtest). Test items were organized in ascending
order based on difficulty level.
Assessments of Nonverbal Abilities
Nonverbal intelligence. The Test of Nonverbal Intelligence–Third Edition
(TONI–3; Brown, Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 1997) is a language-free assessment of
intelligence, aptitude, abstract reasoning, and problem solving suitable for individuals
between the ages of 6 years and 89 years; 11 months. The test consisted of 60 items
arranged in order of increasing difficulty. Children were presented with a series of
shapes/patterns, with one empty space in the series. Children then chose, among possible
shapes/patterns, the one that best completed the series.
Working memory. The 1-shape array memory task (Cowan, AuBuchon,
Gilchrist, Ricker & Saults, 2011; Cowan, Morey, AuBuchon, Zwilling, & Gilchrist,
2010) is an assessment of working memory ability suitable for school-aged children
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(Figure 5). Children were instructed to attend to a set of colored circles that appeared in a
grid of 12 boxes for 500 ms duration. After the grid disappeared, it appeared again with a
single, colored circle (the probe item) and children were asked to decide where the
stimulus belonged (no change, location change, or new color). To make the task more
engaging for children, the grid was presented as a classroom with the colored circles
representing students with different colored shirts. Children were instructed to click the
seat (box) in which the student (probe item) belonged and if that student (probe item) did
not belong anywhere in the classroom, the door icon was to be clicked to send the student
(probe item) to the principal’s office. Children completed 6 practice trials followed by 32
test trials.

Figure 5. 1-Shape Array Memory task (Cowan et al., 2010; 2011) with no change,
location change, and new color probe trials.
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Procedure
Children were tested individually in a laboratory at an urban, public college over
two sessions of approximately 2 hours in duration. The majority of the sessions were
conducted by the author of this dissertation. Other sessions were conducted by a second
doctoral candidate and three undergraduate research assistants. Research assistants were
trained to administer all assessments and were supervised to ensure the accuracy of
procedures. The order of tasks was counterbalanced across participants.

39

CHAPTER FIVE: OVERVIEW OF ANALYSES
Scoring of Tasks and Assessments
Trained research assistants scored data from the 62 participants. Standardized
assessments received a second pass to double-check scoring. The working memory task
was scored by the computer. Inter-rater reliability was calculated for the scoring of all
experimental tasks. The author of this dissertation served as the second rater and scored
data from 13 participants for all tasks. All disagreements were resolved through
discussion. Inter-rater reliability was above 90% on all tasks. Arcsine transformations
were performed on all proportional data.
Analytic Plan
As preliminary analyses, we computed partial correlations (controlling for age)
between each temporal representation task (event ordering, time labeling, diachronic
thinking, and behavioral prediction) and individual measures of language and nonverbal
abilities. Due to issues of multicollinearity between the language assessments, we
subjected them to a principal components analysis. We then computed Pearson
correlation coefficients between each temporal representation task and age to confirm the
age-related advances documented in the literature. Next, we explored whether the
disparate measures of representational change were significantly related using
correlations and principal components analysis. We computed additional partial
correlations (controlling for age) between the temporal representation component and
individual language and nonverbal assessments. In order to address the fourth aim of our
study and explore relationships between temporal representation and developmental
changes in language ability, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory, we ran
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stepwise regression models. We next conducted mediation analyses to further examine
the role of language in the representational development of temporal abilities. Finally,
we ran five stepwise regression analyses entering individual language measures in the
final step to determine if representational abilities are driven by specific language
abilities as opposed to general language skills.
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
The mean accuracy for the temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and
behavioral prediction tasks are presented in Table 1. As can be seen in the table, children
had a range of representational abilities.

Table 1
Mean accuracy for temporal representation tasks.
Tasks

Mean (SD)

Range

Temporal Cognition
Months Relative Order

75.4% (23.7)

25 – 100%

Time Labeling

71.3% (28.5)

0 – 100%

60.5% (34.0)

0 – 100%

73.9% (19.2)

13 – 100%

Diachronic Thinking
Draw Lifecycle of a Tree
Behavioral Prediction
Character Intentions

The mean standardized and raw scores for assessments of receptive vocabulary,
receptive grammar, reading ability, and nonverbal intelligence, as well as mean accuracy
(percent correct) for performance on the working memory task, are presented in Table 2.
The sample displayed diverse verbal and nonverbal abilities.
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Table 2
Mean standardized and raw scores for language and nonverbal tasks.
Standardized Scores
Assessments

Raw Scores

Mean (SD)

Range

Mean (SD)

Range

Receptive Vocabulary
(PPVT–4)

113.4 (14.5)

78 – 146

147.3 (21.1)

93 – 183

Receptive Grammar
(TROG–2)

103.0 (15.2)

67 – 130

15.0 (3.4)

5 – 20

Basic Reading

109.8 (17.2)

78 – 145

40.0 (15.2)

0 – 67

Reading Comprehension

112.4 (17.1)

77 – 144

46.2 (20.0)

0 – 80

Oral Reading Fluency

107.7 (15.6)

78 – 139

34.0 (18.3)

0 – 62

114.3 (13.8)

81 – 144

21.1 (6.4)

4 – 34

N/A

N/A

Verbal Abilities

Reading Ability (WRMT–3)

Nonverbal Abilities
Nonverbal Intelligence
(TONI–3)
Working Memory
(percent correct)

64.5% (14.2)

28 – 87%

Data Reduction
Next, we conducted partial correlations, controlling for age (in months), between
temporal cognition, diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction tasks and individual
measures of language and nonverbal abilities (Table 3).
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†p

.37***

.34**

.30*

< .06, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .005, ****p < .001

Character Intentions

Behavioral Intention

Draw Lifecycle of a Tree

.33*

.34**

.39***

Time Labeling

Diachronic Thinking

.31*

TROG–2

.45****

PPVT–4

Months Relative Order

Temporal Cognition

abilities (raw scores).

.21

.19

.54****

.33**

WRMT–3:
Basic
Reading

.40***

.28*

.51****

.40***

WRMT–3:
Reading
Comp.

.36***

.26*

.59****

.42***

WRMT–3:
Oral
Reading
Fluency

.33**

.12

.26*

.25†

TONI–3

.31*

.31*

.21

.11

Working
Memory

Partial correlations (controlling for age) between temporal representation tasks and measures of language and nonverbal

Table 3

Due to issues of multicollinearity among the standardized assessments of verbal
abilities (Table 4), we subjected the raw scores of receptive vocabulary (PPVT–4),
receptive grammar (TROG–2), and reading (three subscales of WRMT–3) assessments to
principal components analysis.

Table 4
Pearson correlation coefficients between language assessments (raw scores).
TROG–2

WRMT–3:
Basic Reading

WRMT–3:
Reading
Comprehension

WRMT–3:
Oral Reading
Fluency

Zero-Order Correlations
PPVT–4

.67****

.64****

.76****

.66****

TROG–2

–

.67****

.76****

.59****

WRMT–3: Basic
Reading

–

–

.89****

.85****

WRMT–3:
Reading
Comprehension

–

–

–

.85****

Partial Correlations (controlling for age)
PPVT–4

.63****

.51****

.65****

.53****

TROG–2

–

.63****

.77****

.53****

WRMT–3: Basic
Reading

–

–

.86****

.79****

WRMT–3:
Reading
Comprehension

–

–

–

.78****

****

p < .001
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The principal components analysis met the assumptions of linearity (all variables
had at least one correlation coefficient greater than 0.30), sampling adequacy (overall
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was 0.85), and sphericity (Bartlett's test of sphericity was
statistically significant, p < .001). This analysis yielded one component (hereinafter
referred to as “language ability”) with an eigenvalue greater than 1 and explained 78.98%
of the variance, see Table 5 for item loadings.

Table 5
Loadings of the principal components analysis for language abilities (raw scores).
Tasks

Component 1
.84

PPVT–4

.83

TROG–2
WRMT–3: Basic Reading

.92

WRMT–3: Reading Comprehension

.96

WRMT–3: Oral Reading Fluency

.89

Age-Related Changes in Representational Thought
The first aim of the current study was to replicate age-related developments in
temporal representation among tasks of temporal cognition (Months Relative Order and
Time Labeling), diachronic thinking (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) and behavioral
prediction (Character Intentions). Pearson correlation coefficients revealed that accuracy
on the Months Relative Order, r(60) = .48, p < .001, Time Labeling, r(60) = .44, p < .001,
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Draw Lifecycle of a Tree, r(60) = .23, p = .07, and Character Intentions, r(60) = .32, p =
.01, tasks increased with age (in months). This provides confirmation of age-related
improvements in representational thought documented in previous research; however, the
diachronic thinking task (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) did not reach significance.
Correlations Among Representational Tasks
The second aim of the study was to examine whether performance on two
traditional measures of temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling abilities) are
related to performance on tasks of diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction. Each of
the four tasks were significantly correlated with one another (Table 6), suggesting a
relationship between four disparate forms of temporal representation.

Table 6
Pearson correlation coefficients between temporal representation tasks.
Time Labeling

Draw Lifecycle
of a Tree

Character
Intentions

.64****

.39***

.39***

Time Labeling

–

.46****

.37***

Draw Lifecycle of a Tree

–

–

.33**

.55****

.33**

.28*

.41****

.27*

Zero-Order Correlations
Months-Relative-Order

Partial Correlations
(controlling for age)
Months-Relative-Order

*p

Time Labeling

–

Draw Lifecycle of a Tree

–

–

< .05, **p < .01, ***p < .005, ****p < .001
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.28*

Principal Components Analysis
The third aim of the study was to evaluate whether the shared variance in
performance across the four tasks provide evidence that underlying changes in
representational thought apply across disparate aspects of cognition related to the
understanding of time. The principal components analysis met the assumptions of
linearity (all variables had at least one correlation coefficient greater than 0.30; see Table
6 for zero-order correlations), sampling adequacy (overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure
was 0.73) and sphericity (Bartlett's test of sphericity was statistically significant, p <
.001). The principal components analysis revealed one underlying factor (hereinafter
referred to as “temporal representation”) with an eigenvalue greater than 1. This factor
accounted for 57.84% of the variance in scores across the four tasks, see Table 7 for item
loadings.

Table 7
Loadings of the principal components analysis for temporal representation tasks.
Tasks

Component 1

Months Relative Order

.82

Time Labeling

.84

Draw Lifecycle of a Tree

.77

Character Intentions

.66
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The Role of Language and Nonverbal Abilities
Next, we ran partial correlations, controlling for age (in months), between
temporal representation (latent variable) and raw scores of measures of verbal and
nonverbal abilities (Table 8). Finally, we examined the relationship between temporal
representation and assessments of nonverbal intelligence, working memory, and
language. We conducted stepwise regression analysis with temporal representation
(latent variable) as the outcome measure and entered age (months) in Step 1, nonverbal
intelligence (raw scores) and working memory in Step 2, and language abilities (latent
variable) in Step 3.

Table 8
Partial correlations controlling for age between temporal representation and verbal and
nonverbal tasks (raw scores).
Assessments

Temporal Representation (latent variable)

Nonverbal Intelligence

.33**

Working Memory

.32*

Language Abilities (latent variable)

.59****

*p

< .05, **p < .01, ****p < .001

Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 9. At Step 1, age
contributed significantly to temporal representation, F(1, 60) = 19.44, p < .001,
accounting for 24.5% of the variation. At Step 2 nonverbal intelligence and working
memory accounted for an additional 12.8% of the variance, F(3, 58) = 11.47, p < .001,
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and at Step 3, language abilities explained an additional 15.6% of the variation, F(4, 57)
= 15.97, p < .001. Results revealed that language abilities predicted gains in temporal
representation over and above effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, and working
memory. Indeed, these three variables were no longer significant predictors at Step 3.

Table 9
Stepwise multiple regression coefficients with temporal representation as the outcome
variable.
Predictors

Beta ( )

t

Step 1:
.49

4.41****

Age (months)

.27

2.15*

TONI–3

.27

2.16*

Working Memory

.24

2.04*

Age (months)

.10

0.86

TONI–3

.08

0.69

Working Memory

.12

1.15

Language Abilities (latent variable)

.54

4.34****

Age (months)
Step 2:

Step 3:

*p

< .05, ****p < .001
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Language as a Mediating Variable
Taken together, the regression results suggest that language abilities mediate the
effects of age, nonverbal intelligence and working memory on temporal representation.
To explicitly test mediation, we employed bootstrapping to estimate the 95% confidence
intervals of the indirect effect, using the procedure suggested by Hayes and Preacher
(2012) for multiple independent variables and the associated SPSS macro (PROCESS,
downloaded from http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html).
Mediation is assumed to be present when the confidence interval for the indirect effect
does not include 0. The confidence intervals for the indirect effect of all predictors on
temporal representation, based on 5,000 bootstrap samples, was 0.0045 – .0224.
Inspection of the independent indirect effects of each individual independent variable
showed that the effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory on temporal
representation were mediated by language abilities (Figure 6).
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Indirect effect

Language Abilities

Age
Nonverbal Intelligence
Working Memory

Temporal
Representation

Direct effect
Figure 6. Figure displaying language abilities as a mediator of the effect of age,
nonverbal intelligence, and working memory on temporal representation.

Individual Language Measures as Predictors
To further explore the role of language in the development of temporal
representation, five additional stepwise regression models were run with each individual
language task (raw scores) as predictors in Step 3. For all language variables, Step 3 was
significant accounting for additional variance (Table 10).
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Table 10
Stepwise multiple regression coefficients for language measures separately entered at
step 3 with temporal representation as the outcome variable.
Predictors

Beta ( )

t

PPVT–4

.46

3.85****

TROG–2

.30

2.43*

WRMT–3: Basic Reading

.34

2.77**

WRMT–3: Reading Comprehension

.51

3.86****

WRMT–3: Oral Reading Fluency

.50

4.67****

*p

< .05, **p < .01, ****p < .001

The model with receptive vocabulary (PPVT) entered at Step 3 was significant,
F(4, 57) = 14.37, p < .001, ∆R2 = .13, with PPVT being the only significant predictor at
this step (

age

= .11;

TONI

= .17;

WM

= .15;

PPVT

= .46). The model with receptive

grammar (TROG) entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 57) = 10.80, p < .001, ∆R2 = .06,
with TROG and age being significant predictors at this step (
= .18;

TROG

age

= .27;

TONI

= .12;

WM

= .30). The model with basic reading entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4,

57) = 11.51, p < .001, ∆R2 = .07, with basic reading being the only significant predictor at
this step (

age

= .18;

TONI

= .15;

WM

= .18;

BasicR

= .34). The model with reading

comprehension entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 57) = 14.39, p < .001, ∆R2 = .13,
with reading comprehension being the only significant predictor at this step (
.07;

TONI

= .11;

WM

= .14;

RComp

age

=

= .51). Lastly, the model with oral reading fluency

entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 57) = 16.40, p < .001, ∆R2 = .16, with oral reading
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fluency being the only significant predictor at this step (
.15;

ORFluency

age

= .08;

TONI

= .17;

WM

=

= .50). For all language variables except receptive grammar, the effects of

age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory were subsumed by language
ability. For the model with receptive grammar (TROG), age remained a significant
predictor of temporal representation at step 3, t = 2.28, p = .03.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summary
This study explored the contributions of age, language and nonverbal abilities on
the representational development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and
behavioral prediction. In the literature, these disparate forms of temporal representation
have been separately explored (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Boucher et al., 2007;
Friedman, 2005; Montangero et al., 1996; 2000; Nelson, 1996). The current study
provides an attempt to explore tasks measuring these disparate forms of temporal
knowledge within the same sample. Here, a community sample of 62 6- to 10-year-old
children completed two assessments of temporal cognition (event ordering and time
labeling), one assessment of diachronic thinking, and one assessment of behavioral
prediction, as well as a battery of language and nonverbal assessments. The results
generally confirmed age-related changes in temporal representation that have been
documented in the literature. Results also highlighted the contribution of language
(receptive vocabulary, receptive grammar, and literacy) over the contributions of age and
nonverbal abilities to performance on the four tasks. Indeed, language mediated the
effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory. In the sections that follow,
results are discussed in light of the four research questions posed in the introduction.
Discussion and Implications
Age-Related Improvements in Representational Thought
Research from the disparate literature points to similar representational
development across aspects of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral
prediction, i.e., an emergence during the preschool years (Atance & O’Neill, 2005;
55

Friedman, 2005; Nelson, 1996) and dramatic refinement through middle childhood (e.g.,
Boucher et al., 2007; Friedman, 2000; Montangero et al., 1996; 2000; Moore et al.,
2014). The results of the current study provide partial support for these developmental
trends. The relationship between age and each of the tasks replicated previous research
about developmental improvements throughout middle childhood except for the
diachronic thinking (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) task, which was not significantly
correlated with age. One possible explanation is the use of a stricter coding scheme in
terms of defining qualitative change from that used by Boucher and colleagues (2007)
which could have resulted in lower scores. Another possible explanation is that the three
other tasks (Months Relative Order, Time Labeling, Character Intentions) relied more on
socio-cultural knowledge and experience than the diachronic thinking task which requires
formal teaching of biological knowledge. Thus, perhaps the three socio-cultural tasks
were more closely tied to age-related changes in representational thought.
However, a more likely explanation for the diachronic thinking results may be the
difficulty of the task for the age range in this study. Montangero and colleagues (e.g.,
Maurice-Naville & Montangero, 1992; Montangero et al., 1996; Pons & Montangero,
1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992) suggest that diachronic thinking involving the
understanding of qualitative biological change does not reach maturity until the age of 11
to 12 years. Indeed, the average accuracy for this task was 60.5% compared to the other
three tasks which had accuracy scores above 70%. As such, future research should
include older children to fully capture the trajectory of diachronic thinking. However,
despite the nonsignificant relationship between diachronic thinking and age in the current
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sample, the temporal representation latent variable was significantly predicted by age in
the first step of the regression model.
Relationships Among Temporal Representation Tasks
The results suggest that the forms of representational knowledge explored in this
study (temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction) require similar
cognitive abilities that are verbally mediated. Each of the four assessments (Months
Relative Order, Time Labeling, Draw Lifecycle of a Tree, and Character Intentions)
displayed significant positive correlations with one another. The Months Relative Order
task required children to determine the next month in a sequence when presented with a
choice between a month, 2-months and 8-months in the future. This temporal cognition
ability requires children to not only understand the months of the year, but to have a firm
grasp of their order within the calendar. The Time Labeling task required children to
provide the month(s) or day(s) of the week for significant holidays and events. This
temporal cognition task served as a measure of children’s ability to label conventional
time concepts. The Draw Lifecycle of a Tree task required children to draw pictures of a
tree depicting the entire lifecycle from seedling to death. This diachronic thinking task
assessed children’s understanding of biological change over time. Lastly, the Character
Intentions task required children to make predictions about a character’s behavior based
on the order of previous events. This behavioral prediction task measured children’s
understanding of the causal aspect of temporal sequences. Together, these tasks comprise
a variety of forms of temporal representation.
The ability to understand the sequence of events (temporal, biological and
behavioral) may require similar cognitive representations of familiar and routine
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events. Nelson (1996) has shown that children possess generalized event representations
(e.g., general knowledge about familiar events) that are used to define the expected
sequence of events. Children also rely on these generalized event representations to aid
in general cognitive abilities such as memory, story production, and planning (Hudson et
al., 1995; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). As such, it is likely that children rely on these
generalized event representations to order the months of a holiday, provide time labels for
familiar holidays/events, depict the sequence in a tree’s life, and predict the behavior of a
character during an event.
Not surprisingly, the most strongly correlated were the two temporal cognition
tasks (Months Relative Order and Time Labeling) both adapted from Friedman (2000).
These two tasks were measures of vocabulary/fact-based temporal concepts and patterns.
Indeed, the ability to pass the Months Relative Order task requires the ability to label the
months of the year and to place them in temporal order. However, it is interesting to note
that although diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction have been explored as
separate cognitive abilities in the literature, these tasks were correlated with the two
temporal cognition tasks, as well as with each other.
Shared Variance Across Temporal Tasks: Evidence of an Underlying Construct?
All four tasks loaded similarly onto one factor that explained almost 58% of the
variance. According to Nelson (1996), we make sense of time in terms of the ordering of
events and temporal relations, abstract manipulations of time concepts, natural biological
rhythms, and an understanding of the self and other through time. McCormack (2015)
suggests that in addition to this list, we must understand the causal relation between
events/actions in the past, present, and future. Taken together, these theories suggest that
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the shared variance across tasks measuring temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and
behavioral prediction may provide evidence for an underlying construct of temporal
representation. Yet, the one principal component explained just slightly more than half of
the variance across tasks, leaving approximately 42% of the variance unexplained.
Another explanation is that the shared variance may only be reflecting broader
cognitive changes in middle childhood. This shared variance likely includes some
feature of temporal representation, but there may be more general cognitive processes
that are playing a greater role, particularly those processes that are verbally mediated.
For example, the behavioral prediction task (Character Intentions) was taken from the
literature on theory of mind and the diachronic thinking task (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree)
from the literature on children’s understanding of biological and qualitative change
across time. Although these two tasks required temporal abilities, i.e., an understanding
of the causal relations between events in time (McCormack, 2015) and an understanding
of the natural biological rhythms that cycle through time (Nelson, 1996; Montangero,
1996), respectively, they are also indices of additional complex cognitive abilities. As
such, it may be that the shared variance reflects a more general shift in representational
thought, rather than strictly temporal abilities.
This explanation reflects the findings of Moore and colleagues (2014) who used a
larger battery of event ordering, time labeling and diachronic thinking tasks and found
two factors: one component that was associated with performance across all tasks and
measures of vocabulary and nonverbal intelligence and a second component that
distinguished the diachronic thinking synthesis task (conceiving a temporal succession of
events as a unitary whole) from the spatial (marking events spatially in time using a
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picture of a road) and labeling (providing conventional time concepts for the months of
holidays) tasks. This suggests that the ability to “envision and name an event given a set
of distinct sub-events (i.e., moments in time) was unrelated to knowledge of conventional
time patterns” (Moore et al., 2014; p. 289). It may be that the first component in their
study reflected greater cognitive development, rather than specific advances in temporal
abilities; whereas the second factor was able to distinguish between temporal cognition
and diachronic thinking tasks suggesting that these abilities may not be as closely tied
beyond broader cognitive changes.
Indeed, both Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Nelson (1996) propose theories of
representational development within and across cognitive domains as a function of
representational change from implicit procedural knowledge to explicit and flexible
mental representations throughout infancy and childhood. The results of the current study
do not have the power to arbitrate between the two theories (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith’s
representational resdescription and Nelson’s experiential view of representational
development), but rather suggests that both may explain the general developmental gains
in temporal representation during middle childhood.
Influence of Nonverbal Abilities
Temporal representation was related to nonverbal intelligence and working
memory abilities. A representation of time requires the flexibility of thought and draws
on the ability to hold on to multiple representations at once and the ability to detect and
represent patterns. These executive function skills are also required to complete the
assessments of nonverbal intelligence and working memory used in the current
study. Working memory is important in planning, particularly in the development,
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maintenance, and execution of plans (Gilhooly, 2005; Owen, 1997). Hudson and
colleagues have proposed that knowledge about the world, particularly event knowledge,
plays an integral role in the development of plans (Hudson & Fivush, 1991; Hudson et
al., 1995). A variety of tasks and standardized measures have been designed to assess
planning skills as they relate to executive function (Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004;
Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001; Gardner & Rogoff, 1990; Hudson et al., 1995).
However, this study is, to our knowledge, the first to explore the effects of working
memory on a battery of temporal representation tasks measuring temporal cognition,
diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction. Our findings expand upon the work of
Moore and colleagues (2014), which reported links between temporal representation and
nonverbal intelligence, to highlight the role of working memory in the development of
temporal skills. Together, this suggests that there may be a link between general
(nonverbal) cognitive abilities and the ability to recognize and represent temporal
concepts, patterns, change, and causality.
Language as the Mechanism for Representational Change
Although age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory were significant
predictors of temporal representation, the results suggest that these effects are mediated
by language skills. When entered into the regression model at the final step, language
abilities alone accounted for the added variance. This supports the theoretical views of
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Nelson (1996), who emphasize the role of language, albeit
differently, in representational development. According to Karmiloff-Smith (1992), at
the final level of representational redescription, links across common microdomains can
be made, and then eventually links across domains, using the “cross-system code…close
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enough to natural language for easy translation into stable, communicable form” (p. 23).
In the current study, language would allow manipulations of knowledge to occur across
the microdomains of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction.
For Nelson (1996) language plays a role in representational development through its use
during and about events. As children participate in everyday activities, they internalize
information about events to form mental event representations that become more flexible
and accessible to verbal reporting. As these representations are refined, children become
able to make sense of and verbally represent time. Both theoretical positions make the
case for the critical role of language in representational development; yet, only Nelson
(1996) proposed a theory for how language would contribute to a representation of time,
making it difficult for the current study to arbitrate between these theories. However, the
current results provide initial evidence of representational changes in temporal
knowledge throughout middle childhood as mediated by language.
It is important to note that all tasks required verbal instructions, and an
understanding of said instructions, in addition to the linguistic demands of the tasks
themselves. Although two of the tasks (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree and Character
Intention) did not require verbal responses, participants tended to use language to guide
them in completing the task or to help explain their responses. Participants also used this
type of private speech to aid in their completion of the Months Relative Order task. This
observation matches Friedman’s (1990) findings that children have a difficult time
starting at an arbitrary point when asked to order the days of the week and months of the
year; children tend to start at the beginning (e.g., Sunday and January) and proceed in
order until they reach this arbitrary starting point.
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This can be directly connected to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) theory where
proceduralized knowledge occurs prior to explicit (i.e., consciously accessible)
representations that can eventually be manipulated and verbalized. This would suggest
that younger children may rely more on procedural knowledge to solve temporal tasks
than older children who have temporal representations in a format similar to natural
language that allows for both conscious access and verbalization. Here, the temporal
representation tasks were neither audio- nor video-recorded and as such, conclusions
cannot be drawn regarding the verbal strategies used during task completion, something
that future tasks should explore in relation to representational development during middle
childhood.
In the current study, language was restricted to receptive vocabulary, grammar,
and literacy. However, this is only part of the range of language skills refined during
middle childhood. In addition to incorporating semantic and syntactic assessments,
future studies should explore expressive language abilities and the role of conversation.
Nelson and Fivush (2004) have documented the role of conversation in the development
of episodic memory and personal narrative ability: language provides the organizational
structure for personal experience, it provides the representational format for positioning
the self in time through narrative discourse, and enables children to enter into dialogues
with others and engage in perspective taking. Therefore, early conversations with parents
may be integral to the development of the language skills required of temporal
representation.
Evidence suggests that children’s speech reflects the language patterns of adults
and that mother-child interactions during events influence children’s later recall; for
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example, children whose mothers provided more details during an event reported more
details of that event after a delay than children of less elaborative mothers (Haden,
Ornstein, Eckerman, & Didow, 2001). In this study, mothers interacted with their 30- to
40-month-old children around three novel play events (birdwatching, camping, and icecream shop). In the birdwatching event, mother and child went on a birdwatching
adventure in the lab. They were first asked to select from an array of birdwatching gear
(e.g., binoculars, bird-callers, clothing) to use in their adventure. Then the dyads used
these tools to explore the lab, finding clues (e.g., feathers, eggs) that lead them to various
locations of birds. Lastly, the dyad retrieved the birds and brought them to a new garden
location with trees, flowers, birdhouses, and birdfeeders. The camping and ice-cream
shop events were set up in a similar fashion. Children were asked to recall these events 1
day or 1 week later. The few details that children recalled were the aspects of the events
that mothers talked about and children responded to either verbally or nonverbally (e.g.,
pointing). Therefore, future research should explore the influence of parental input,
particularly in terms of temporal concepts and event representations, on children’s
temporal representation abilities.
It is important to note that the relationship between language and temporal
representation held regardless of the language measure used in the current study; the
independent regression models with each individual language measures remained
significant (in the model with receptive grammar, the effect of age remained significant
in the final step). This suggests that it is not one specific language ability, but rather
verbal abilities in general that contributes the development of representational thought.
This is consistent with Bates’ (1998; Bates & Goodman, 1997) discussion of the
64

inseparability of grammar and the lexicon (i.e., that the same mechanisms used to acquire
vocabulary are used to acquire grammar), a challenge to traditional linguistic nativism
and grammatical autonomy (e.g., Chomsky, 1965). Bates suggests that “the
heterogeneous set of linguistic forms that occur in any natural language (i.e., words,
morphemes, phrase structure types) may be acquired and processed by a unified
processing system, one that obeys a common set of activation and learning principles”
(1997, p. 135).
The current findings also confirm those from the literature on language and theory
of mind abilities. For example, a meta-analysis on young children’s understanding of
false-belief explored the role of language in 104 studies (N = 8,891; Milligan et al.,
2007). The meta-analysis explored language in terms of general language, receptive
vocabulary, semantics, syntax, and memory for complements. Results indicated
significant moderate effect sizes for each language aspect independent of age, suggesting
that theory of mind skills are not reliant upon any particular aspect(s) of language, but
rather language in general. This is contradictory to de Villier’s (2005) theory that falsebelief understanding is contingent upon the child’s ability to master the grammar of
complements. As such, future studies of temporal representation, particularly studies
involving the prediction of behaviors or projection of the self into the future (abilities that
draw on theory of mind skills), should incorporate additional measures of semantics and
syntax in order to further disentangle the relationship between representation and
language.
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Limitations and Future Directions
This study adds to the literature demonstrating the developmental trends in
temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), diachronic thinking, and
behavioral prediction throughout middle childhood. These abilities, particularly those
that require forward-ordering abilities, may be especially important in the study of the
development of episodic foresight (i.e., the ability to imagine personal future events;
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). When planning for future events, it is important, and
necessary, to consider when the event will take place (Hudson & Mayhew, 2011). It is
also likely that imagining possible future events may employ similar mechanisms to
imagining (i.e., “re-living”) events from the past (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Busby &
Suddendorf, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1985) and rely on general
cognitive skills such as executive function and working memory (Ford, Driscoll, Shum,
& Macaulay, 2012). Indeed, support for this theory comes from studies with individuals
with episodic memory deficits. Research shows that these individuals present with
difficulties imagining events that might happen in their personal future as well as
recalling their personal past (Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; Addis,
Wong, & Schacter, 2008; D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Klein,
Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985).
This study did not incorporate measures of episodic memory or foresight, and
therefore is limited in its ability to generalize the developmental improvements found in
the current study to more “autonoetic” (i.e., the awareness of our existence and identity
extending from the personal past through the present to the future) domains of temporal
representation. Tulving (1972; 1985) suggests that the ability to travel through time and
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represent events temporally is a function of the declarative memory system (e.g., it
requires semantic knowledge of general temporal concepts and episodic knowledge on
one’s personal experiences). For example, it is our semantic memory that allows us to
recall the location and appearance of our childhood home, but it is our episodic memory
that allows us to recall, and re-experience, the emotions and events during our first family
Christmas in that home. Researchers (Mahr & Csibra, in press; Nelson, 1996) have
proposed similar representational mechanisms of episodic memory development as those
proposed for temporal understanding in general. Nelson’s experiential theory has been
discussed at length in this dissertation and as such will not be revisited here; however,
Mahr and Csibra (in press) offer a metarepresentational approach suggesting that episodic
memory plays a generative role in communicative interaction. They draw a distinction
between event memories and episodic memories. Both share the qualities of being quasiexperiential, event specific, and past-directed. However, event memories include more
limited source information, are not located in subjective time, are not self-referential, are
not always conscious, and do not have a narrative structure; whereas episodic memory is
autonoetic and epistemically generative.
Future research should therefore explore differences in semantic temporal
representation and episodic temporal representation during this time period (i.e., middle
childhood). Research on other forms of temporal representation (i.e., event ordering, time
labeling, diachronic thinking, predicting future behaviors, and episodic memory) has
shown developmental trends throughout middle childhood regarding the ability to think
about the past and future. Therefore, it would follow that similar trends would exist in
episodic foresight abilities. Future event ordering may be especially important in the
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study of the development of episodic foresight in that when planning for future events, it
is important, and necessary, to consider when the event will take place (Hudson &
Mayhew, 2011). Thinking about an event that will take place tomorrow may be different
from thinking about an event that will take place next year.
An additional limitation to the present study is the somewhat small size of the
sample for the number of analyses that were run. Future studies that use the same
methods should collect data from a larger group of children in order to increase the
chances of detecting small to moderate effects. Additionally, due to the vast variability in
temporal representation abilities, researchers may want to include children encompassing
a wider age range, from 5- to 12-years. This may be especially important in findings that
use additional measures of diachronic thinking abilities, as Montangero and colleagues
(Maurice-Naville & Montangero, 1992; Montangero et al., 1996; Pons & Montangero,
1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992) suggest that these skills continue to develop
through the age of 12 years. Future studies may also wish to consider including a more
diverse sample in terms of socioeconomic status. Flores (as cited in Nelson, 1996) found
that Headstart children from homeless and poverty homes performed more poorly on
sequencing tasks and temporal knowledge, indicating that poverty may influence MERs
and temporal representation in general and should be explored further, particularly in
regard to the effect of language on temporal skills.
Lastly, the present study focused on the relationship between language and
temporal representation in typically developing, English-speaking children and thus is
limited in its generalizability. Future research should explore the development of
temporal representation in languages other than English and include a range of clinical
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populations, particularly children with autism spectrum disorders. Autism spectrum
disorder is characterized by impairments in social-communication and restricted interests
and inflexible or repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); research
with this population has also documented difficulties in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen,
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), executive function (Hill, 2004), and language
abilities (Tager-Flusberg, 1996). Difficulties in these domains may make it difficult for
individuals with autism to project themselves forward and backward in time. Indeed,
research has highlighted marked impairments in diachronic thinking (Boucher et al.,
2007), episodic memory (Goldman, 2008; Goldman & DeNigris, 2015; Terret et al.,
2013), and future thinking (Terret et al., 2013) among school-aged children with autism
spectrum disorder. As the results of the current study suggest, language plays a critical
role the development of temporal representation and therefore should be explored further
among this clinical population.
Conclusions
This study examined the relationship between disparate measures of temporal
representation that have emerged in the literature. Research has independently explored
developments in temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), diachronic
thinking, and behavioral prediction, but none to date have examined the relationship
among these four abilities in connection to advances in language, nonverbal intelligence,
and working memory. This study builds on prior work to explore the developmental
trajectory of these representational skills through middle childhood, a time when children
are attending school and experiencing dramatic gains in cognitive function. Results
suggest that age-related developments in temporal representation are mediated by general
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language abilities, a view that is consistent with Nelson’s (1996) view of language
acquisition and children’s conceptualization of time. Given the importance of an
advanced representation of time on one’s ability to effectively manage the demands of
daily life, future work should explore the role that differences in temporal skills in middle
childhood may play in self-regulation, academic development, and independent
functioning.
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APPENDIX A: PARENT/GUARDIAN QUESTIONNAIRE

A.
Child's Name: ________________________________________________ Age: _____________
Date of Birth: ___________________ Home Phone Number: ____________________________
School: _____________________________________________________ Grade: ____________

Mother's Name: _________________________________________________________________
Occupation:____________________________________________________________________
Highest Level of Education: Less than High School/GED______

High School/GED ______

Some College but No Degree ______ Associate’s Degree ______ Bachelor’s Degree ______
Master’s Degree ______

PhD______

JD/MD______

Prefer not to say ______

Father's Name: _________________________________________________________________
Occupation:____________________________________________________________________
Highest Level of Education: Less than High School/GED______

High School/GED ______

Some College but No Degree ______ Associate’s Degree ______ Bachelor’s Degree ______
Master’s Degree ______

PhD______

JD/MD______

Race/Ethnicity (check as many as applicable)
⎕ White/Caucasian
⎕ Black/African American/Caribbean
⎕ Hispanic/Latino/a
⎕ Asian
⎕ Middle Eastern
⎕ Other: ____________________
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Prefer not to say ______

B.
List as many different languages that are spoken at home (for example, English, French, Spanish,
Patois, Arabic, etc.): __________________
_______________

__________________

__________________
__________________

__________________
_________________

What is your child’s primary language? ______________________________________________
What other languages does your child speak? _________________________________________

Mother’s Primary Language: _____________________________________________________
Other languages the mother speaks fluently: _________________________________________
Father’s Primary Language: ______________________________________________________
Other languages the father speaks fluently: ___________________________________________

Who are the people the child frequently interacts with (parents, siblings, grandparents, nanny,
etc.)?
Name

Age

Relationship

Language spoken

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________

_______________________

_______

______________________

__________________
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C.
Is your child's speech difficult to understand? No ______ Yes ______
(If YES, please explain) _________________________________________________
Do you think your child exhibits a language delay? No ______ Yes ______
(If YES, please explain)
_____________________________________________________________
(If YES, when did you first notice the language delay?
_____________________________________

Is there any history of the following in the family (check all that apply):
Speech/Language disorders _____

Hearing impairments _____

Learning disorders _____

(If YES, please explain)
_____________________________________________________________

Has your child been evaluated by or worked with any of the following? (check all that apply):
Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) Doctor ______
Speech Language Pathologist ______

Neurologist ______

Audiologist ______

Psychologist ______

Reading Specialist ______

Occupational Therapist _____ Physical Therapist _____ Other_______________________
(If YES, please explain)
_____________________________________________________________________________

Do you think your child hears well? No ______ Yes ______
(If NO, please explain)
______________________________________________________________
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D.
Does your child exhibit any antisocial or socially inappropriate behaviors (for example, avoiding
interactions, consistently playing alone, etc.)? No ______ Yes ______
(If YES, please explain)
_____________________________________________________________
Does your child exhibit any repetitive behaviors or self-stimulating behaviors (for example,
rocking or arm flapping, etc.) for no apparent reason? No ______ Yes ______
(If YES, please explain)
_____________________________________________________________
Does your child maintain eye contact? No ______ Yes ______
(If NO, please explain)
______________________________________________________________

E.
Can your child tell time? No ______ Yes ______
Does your child wear a watch? No ______

Yes, frequently______

Yes, occasionally ______

Does your child use a calendar? No _____

Yes, frequently _____

Yes, occasionally ______

Does your child keep track of his/her own schedules and deadlines?
No ______

Yes, frequently ______

Yes, occasionally ______

Is there any information you would like to share with us to help us understand your child better?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B: PARENT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Parents’ demographic information. Frequencies reported (percentages in parentheses).
Mothers

Fathers

Less than a High School
Degree

3 (5.1%)

4 (6.8%)

High School or GED

6 (10.2%)

12 (20.3%)

Associate’s Degree

5 (8.5%)

3 (5.1%)

Some College but no Degree

8 (13.6%)

3 (5.1%)

Bachelor's Degree

16 (27.1%)

18 (30.5%)

Master's Degree

15 (25.4%)

12 (20.3%)

5 (8.5%)

3 (5.1%)

0

1 (1.7%)

1 (1.7%)

4 (6.8%)

English

44 (74.6%)

44 (74.6%)

Other

15 (25.4%)

12 (20.3%)

Highest Level of Education

PhD
MD/JD
Prefer not to say
Primary Language

NA
─
3 (5%)
Note: Out of the 62 children in the study, 59 parents responded to the parent/guardian
questionnaire.
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APPENDIX C: PARENTAL REPORT OF CHILD LANGUAGE ABILITIES
Frequencies reported (percentages in parentheses).
Speech Difficult to Understand

Speech Delay

No

56 (94.9%)

55 (93.2%)

Yes

3 (5.1%)

4 (6.8%)

Note: All children reported here (n = 59) met clinical cut-offs for language disorders on
all standardized language assessments and were therefore included in all analyses.
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